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Judith Jarvis Thomson on abortion; a libertarian perspective1 
I. Introduction 
 
Abortion is one of the most vexing issues faced by society. On the one hand, there are those who 
favor the pro-choice position. In their view, the woman, and she alone (along with the advice of 
her doctor – but the final decision must be hers), should be able to legally determine on what 
basis, and whether, her pregnancy should be conducted.  She should be as free to end her 
pregnancy at any stage of the development of her fetus, or give birth to it after the usual term of 
nine months. On the other hand, there are those who favor what is called the pro-life position. In 
this perspective, the fetus, from the moment of conception, is a full rights-bearing human being. 
To abort this small person is to kill it, and to do so should be considered outright first-degree 
murder. Judith Jarvis Thomson is a highly respected philosopher who spent her career at MIT, 
and has taught at the University of Pittsburgh, the University of California at Berkeley Law 
School, and Yale Law School. Libertarianism is the philosophy based on private property rights 
and the non-aggression principle. The leader of this school of thought is Murray N. Rothbard. 




Thomson’s views on abortion with those emanating from the libertarian political philosophy. 
The objective is to discern areas of agreement and disagreement. The discussion that will occur 
will be to quote sections of her paper, and then comment on them. Here is a preview of my 
conclusion: while there are important overlaps between her views and my libertarian ones, 
unexpectedly sharp and important ones, given that she does not operate in this tradition, cites 
nothing from this tradition, seems oblivious to it, there are also important differences. To wit, she 
partially, but does not fully, embrace the notion of evictionism, according to which the woman 
may at any time in her pregnancy evict the unwanted fetus from her body, she may never murder 
that small person. 
 
In section II we introduce the players in this debate over abortion law. The burden of section III 
is to consider Thomson’s Opening Statement. In section IV we discuss the right to life; in V, 
Thomson’s violinist; in VI, killing versus letting die; in VII, third parties; in VIII, Thomson as 
libertarian; in IX, using another person’s body; in X, abortion in the case of rape; and in XI, 




The present essay is an attempt to analyze Judith Jarvis Thomson2 (1971) from a 
libertarian perspective. In it I will review her excellent essay through the lens of this philosophy. 
Why do I undertake this task? For two reasons. One, I regard JJT (1971) as the single best 
written, well thought out, most magnificent analysis of abortion -- from a non-libertarian vantage 
                                                 
1 I wish to thank Bradley Warschauer and Andrew Collins for editorial assistance. All errors of 
course are my own responsibility.  
2 Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 47 (1971). 
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point. Second, the libertarian examinations of the pro-life, pro-choice controversy3 are very 
similar to hers. I am here to explore the differences, not mainly the similarities, of which there 
are many, between the two treatments. I do so since I am an advocate of product differentiation, 
that is to say clarity. As my goal is the promotion of liberty, I shall attempt to show the 
differences between her views and those that fully espouse liberty on this vital issue.  
 
There are two different philosophies publicly in contention over abortion: the pro-life and 
the pro-choice perspectives. Abortion consists of two separate acts; the failure to sharply 
distinguish between them has lead, I contend, to more heat than light in this controversy. The 
                                                 
3 For libertarian publications on evictionism see Walter E. Block, Should Abortion Be 
Criminalized? Rejoinder to Akers, Davies and Shaffer on Abortion, 2 MGMT.  EDUC. SCI. TECH. 
J. 33 (2014); Walter E. Block, Evictionism and Libertarianism, 35 J.  MED. &  PHIL. 290 (2014); 
Walter E. Block, Roy Whitehead, Compromising the Uncompromisable: A Private Property 
Rights Approach to Resolving the Abortion Controvery, 4 APPALACHIAN L. REV. 1 (2005); 
Jeremiah Dyke, Walter E. Block, Explorations in Property Rights: Conjoined Twins, 3 
LIBERTARIAN PAPERS 38 (2011); For critiques of these libertarian views on this subject, see, 
Becky Akers, Not My Definition - Or Webster’s Either - of ‘Tresspassing,’  LEWROCKWELL 
WEBSITE (Sept. 6, 2012), https://lewrockwell.com/lrc-blog/not-my-definition-or-websters-either-
of-tresspassing/; Becky Akers, What if the ‘Fetus’ Could Shoot Back?, LEWROCKWELL WEBSITE 
(Sept. 12, 2012), https://www.lewrockwell.com/lrc-blog/what-if-the-fetus-could-shoot-back/; 
Jim Davies, Abortion, Strike The Root (Sept. 24, 2012), http://strike-the-root.com/abortion; Sean 
Parr, Departurism and the Libertarian Axiom of Gentleness, 3 LIBERTARIAN PAPERS 34 (2011); 
Sharon Presley & Robert Cooke, The Right to Abortion: A Libertarian Defense, ASS’N OF 
LIBERTARIAN FEMINISTS, http://www.alf.org/abortion.php (1979); Butler Shaffer, Of Children 
and Fetuses, LEWROCKWELL WEBSITE (Sept. 17, 2012) 
https://www.lewrockwell.com/2012/09/butler-shaffer/of-children-and-fetuses/; Jakub Bozydar 
Wisniewski, A Critique of Block on Abortion and Child Abandonment, 2 LIBERTARIAN PAPERS 
16 (2010); Jakub Bozydar Wisniewski, Rejoinder to Block’s Defense of Evictionism, 2 
LIBERTARIAN PAPERS 27 (2010); Jakub Bozydar Wisniewski, Response to Block on Abortion, 
Round Three, 3 LIBERTARIAN PAPERS 6 (2011); Jakub Bozydar Wisniewski, Abortion, 
Libertarianism and Evictionism: A Last Word, 5 LIBERTARIAN PAPERS 153; For rejoinders to 
these critiques see Walter E. Block, Objections to the Libertarian Stem Cell Compromise, 2 
LIBERTARIAN PAPERS 34 (2010); Walter E Block, Rejoinder to Wisniewski on Abortion, 3 
LIBERTARIAN PAPERS 4 (2011); Walter E. Block, Response to Wisniewski on Abortion, Round 
Two, 3 LIBERTARIAN PAPERS 4 (2011); Walter E. Block, Response to Wisniewski on Abortion, 
Round Three, 3 LIBERTARIAN PAPERS 37 (2011); Walter E Block, Should Abortion Be 
Criminalized? Rejoinder to Akers, Davies and Shaffer on Abortion, 2 MGMT. EDUC. SCI. TECH. J. 
33 (2014); Walter E. Block, Response to Wisniewski on Abortion, Round Four, 2 MGMT. EDUC. 
SCI. TECH. J.1 (2014); Walter E. Block, Evictionism is Libertarian; Departurism is not: Critical 
Comment on Parr, 3 LIBERTARIAN PAPERS 36 (2011); Walter E. Block, Toward a Libertarian 
Theory of Evictionism, 35 J.  FAM. & ECON. ISSUES 290 (2014); Walter E. Block, Question and 





first element is removing the fetus from the womb; the second is killing it. The pro-choice side of 
this debate advocates that the pregnant woman be allowed to engage in both; the pro-life 
supporters say neither one is legitimate. Evictionism is a compromise between these two extreme 
positions. Devotees of this viewpoint maintain that the woman in question be allowed to evict 
her baby, at any stage of her pregnancy, but not, ever, to kill the fetus, since that would be 
murder. Given the present level of medical technology, evictionism in practice sides with the 
pro-life side of this debate in the last trimester, and with the pro-choice alternative in the first six 
months. Why? This is because, at present, the baby is viable outside of the womb only for the 
last three months of its sojourn in its mother’s body, but not for the first half year. This stems 
from the fact that if the fetus is prematurely removed from the womb, it will perish, and the 
present dividing point between life and death for the evictee is at the end of six months. Of 
course, as medical techniques improve and the baby can survive earlier and earlier in its 
gestation period, as a practical matter, evictionism will more and more come to resemble the pro-
life, and less and less the pro-choice side of this debate. When physicians can provide a safe 
haven for the fertilized egg (the “acorn” in JJT’s analogy) at any stage of its development, the 
evictionist philosophy will fold into that of pro-life. But this viewpoint will always and ever 
remain one conceptually distinct from the other two on this issue, since unjust killing (murder) 
will always be an entirely separate matter from a mere change in geographical address. However, 
were evictionism to be adopted today, at one fell swoop all babies in their third trimester would 
be safeguarded. The brutal and despicable partial birth abortion and all such other murderous 
acts would be banned by law. 
 
IV. Thomson’s Opening Statement  
 
JJT claims that the fetus is no more a human being than is an acorn an oak tree. 4  
Therefore, it has no rights, at least not those of a person. This is problematic for several reasons. 
First, the real issue is not whether or not the fetus is a member of our species, although it is 
difficult to see how this can be denied. Rather, it is whether or not it (he!) is a rights bearing 
entity. Why might the very young baby5 not be thought of as having rights? One possibility is 
that he is not conscious. But if there were the criterion, all of those of us who are asleep, or 
unconscious, or drunk, could be murdered or raped with impunity, and this simply will not do. 
Could it be that this agglomeration of cells is not entitled to rights because it is not (yet) a human 
being? This hypothesis, too, must be rejected, for they constitute a human fetus, not one of a 
different species, such as a horse or a pig. Another difficulty is that the acorn and the oak have 
precisely the same degree or rights. Namely, none at all. So, yes, an acorn is not an oak, but this 
distinction is ethically, legally, irrelevant. 
 
Third, a practical matter. No one ever aborted an early stage fetus, at least not before the 
advent of the RU846 pill. This could not then be done until these a few cells were more 
developed than at the acorn level equivalent. They constituted a far too small amount of 
                                                 
4 Thomson, supra note 2, at 47.   
5 Putting matters thusly of course biases us in one direction on this issue. 
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protoplasm for that. No abortion could take place during this era6 until weeks after conception. 
Let us return to the acorn -- a few weeks after it has been developed. It is, yet, an oak tree? No, 
not yet. But it is now an oak sapling. In JJT’s analogy the oak tree in effect has “rights”7 the 
acorn does not, but what of the sapling? Does it have some rights, perhaps more than the acorn 
but less than the tree? Again, no, since none of these entities have any right at all not to be 
aggressed against.8 JJT seems to believe that the adult human being, and a member of this 
species after birth, a baby, have rights, but the one before birth, whether a fetus of eight and a 
half minutes or eight and a half months, have none. This seems to be arbitrary and capricious, 
since the human being one minute before or after birth seem to be very similar, at least 
biologically. The only real difference between the two would appear to be one of location, or 
geography or street address. 
 
Why go on about all this? Is the present discussion not superfluous, since JJT is willing to 
deal with this situation hypothetically?9 No. For the very last words of her essay are:  
“… it should be remembered that we have only been pretending throughout that the fetus is a 
human being from the moment of conception. A very early abortion is surely not the killing of a 
person, and so is not dealt with by anything I have said here.”10 This means that she favors 
abortion, not evictionism, something directly contrary to the libertarian position. 
 
V. Right to Life  
 
Another quarrel I have with this author is that she states “every person has a right to 
life.”11 But there is no such thing, at least not for the libertarian. In this philosophy, there are only 
negative rights: the right not to be murdered, raped, kidnapped, stolen from, threatened with 
violence, etc. Since all rights logically imply obligations, everyone else has a duty not to murder, 
rape, enslave, etc. If there were a right to food, clothing, shelter, etc., then other people would 
have not merely a moral responsibility to supply these goods, but a legal one. How does this 
work out regarding a right to life? If it existed which it does not, it would oblige everyone else to 
be a Good Samaritan; they would be legally required to keep all needy persons alive. If someone 
is starving to death anywhere in the world, a constant occurrence unfortunately, all other people, 
even located 10,000 miles away, would not be just “in effect” murderers, but actually out and out 
                                                 
6 It is important to discuss the situation during this epoch, since libertarian theory applies to all 
time periods without exception. 
7 I am analogizing from her words. She denies rights to the fetus since it is not human. If the oak 
tree had rights, I infer from her, then the acorn would not, since it is not (yet) matured. 
8 There are of course some philosophers who maintain that animals have (at least partial) rights 
(Peter Singer, PRACTICAL ETHICS 48 (1979), but none to my knowledge stretch this to flora.  
9 Thomson, supra note 2, at 48. “But I shall not discuss any of this. For it seems to me to be of 
great interest to ask what happens if, for the sake of argument, we allow the premise” that the 
fetus is a rights-bearing human being from the fertilized egg stage and onward. 
10 Id. at 66.  
11 Id. at 48. She also avers: “… we must certainly grant that innocent persons have a right to 
life.” Id. at 51.  
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guilty of this heinous crime. This claim would of course be rejected by all libertarians. JJT, in 
taking on this position,12 thus reveals herself as an opponent of this perspective. 
 
She continues as follows:  
 
So the fetus has a right to life. No doubt the mother has a right to decide what 
shall happen in and to her body; everyone would grant that. But surely a 
person's right to life is stronger and more stringent than the mother's right to 
decide what happens in and to her body, and so outweighs it. So the fetus 
may not be killed; an abortion may not be performed.13 
 
Of course, JJT is speaking hypothetically; she, as it turns out, favors the right to abort. 
But even at this level of the debate, difficulties crop up. For a basic premise of libertarianism is 
that rights do not, cannot, clash. If there appears to be a conflict between two different “rights” it 
is because one or the other (or both) are improperly specified. For example, suppose there are 
two drowning swimmers and there is but room for one in the (small) lifeboat. Only one can live, 
the other must die. It cannot be denied that there is some sort of an incompatibility in this 
scenario. But there is no conflict in rights such that we must “weigh” each of them to see which 
one should prevail, perhaps to what degree for each. Rather, at least in libertarian theory, there is 
a clear resolution: whichever of the two of them owns the row boat gets to decide its use. 
Suppose it is the private property of neither of them. Then, the conveyance goes to the one who 
rented it. If this tie-breaker does not apply, and the property has been abandoned (or the owner 
cannot be found) then the new legitimate holder of the title to this boat is he who seizes it first, 
and thus is considered to be the homesteader.14 But suppose there is a tie, an exact one: two 
                                                 
12 She does not clearly do so. In some passages this appears to be her position, but not in others, 
see below. 
13 Id. at 48. 
14 For the libertarian theory on this process see Walter E. Block, Earning Happiness Through 
Homesteading Unowned Land: A Comment on ‘Buying Misery with Federal Land’ by Richard 
Stroup, 15 J.  SOC. POL. & ECON. STUD. 237 (1990); Walter E. Block, Michael R. Edelstein, 
Popsicle sticks and homesteading land for nature preserves, 7 ROMANIAN ECON. & BUS. REV. 7 
(2012); Walter E. Block, Richard Epstein, Debate on Eminent Domain, 1 NYU J.  L. & LIBERTY 
1144 (2005); Walter E. Block, Guillermo Yeatts, The Economics and Ethics of Land Reform: A 
Critique of the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace’s ‘Toward a Better Distribution of Land: 
The Challenge of Agrarian Reform.’, 15 J.  NAT’L. RES. & ENVTL. L. 37 (1999-2000); Per 
Bylund, Man and Matter: How the Former Gains Ownership of the Latter, 4 LIBERTARIAN 
PAPERS (2012); Hugo Grotius, The Law of War and Peace (A. C. Campbell trans., B Boothroyd 
1814) (1625); Hans-Hermann Hoppe, The Economics and Ethics of Private Property: Studies in 
Political Economy and Philosophy, Boston: Kluwer; 1993;  Hans-Hermann Hoppe, Of Private, 
Common, and Public Property and the Rationale for Total Privatization, 3 LIBERTARIAN PAPERS 
1 (2011); Stephan Kinsella, A Libertarian Theory of Contract: Title Transfer, Binding Promises, 
and Inalienability, 17 J. LIBERTARIAN STUD. 11 (2003); Stephan Kinsella, How We Come to Own 
Ourselves, MISES.ORG (Sept. 7, 2006), http://www.mises.org/story/2291; Stephan Kinsella, What 
Libertarianism Is, MISES.COM (Aug. 21, 2009), https://mises.org/library/what-libertarianism;  
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people lay hands on this property at precisely the same time. Then and only then must we impose 
arbitrary rule.15 This occurs in baseball when the runner and the ball arrive at first base 
instantaneously. The rule there is, the tie goes to the batter.  When two motorists arrive at a four 
way stop sign together, the right of way goes to he who is on the right. The only difficulty arises 
when four drivers do so. But, this, along with the ties mentioned in the text, must occur only on 
rare occasions, and the law does not take account of trifles, the doctrine of de minimus. It cannot 
be too often, either, that two swimmers, adrift in the ocean, arrive at a life-sustaining plank at the 
same time either. Why has the common law not made any analogous determination in the life 
boat case? This can only be a surmise, but one possibility is that this occurs too rarely for the law 
to take account of it. Perhaps if the law merchant did address this question, and/or private road 
owners16 did so regarding the question of four motorists arriving at stop signs simultaneously, 
they might arrive at some arbitrary rule as whoever arrives from the north gets first priority, from 
the south second, from the west third and fourth for the east.17 In any case, there need not be any 
clash of rights in any of the situations under discussion. 
 
VI. Thomson’s Violinist  
 
We now arrive at JJT’s famous violinist case. This is brilliant and insightful on her part, 
but marred by the fact that she accepts the “balancing” of rights fallacy. From the perspective of 
libertarianism, which favors evictionism and denies that rights, properly construed, can ever 
clash, the analysis is simple. The bed partner of the violinist may cut the cord that connects them 
at any time she wants to do so, even if the violinist would perish as a result.18 
 
 Next, consider this statement of hers:  
 
In this case, of course, you were kidnapped, you didn't volunteer for the 
operation that plugged the violinist into your kidneys. Can those who oppose 
abortion on the ground I mentioned make an exception for a pregnancy due 
                                                 
Stephan Kinsella, Homesteading, Abandonment, and Unowned Land in the Civil Law, 
MISES.ORG (May 22, 2009), http://blog.mises.org/10004/homesteading-abandonment-and-
unowned-land-in-the-civil-law/;  John Locke, An Essay Concerning the True Origin, Extent and 
End of Civil Government (1948); Ellen Frankel Paul, Property Rights and Eminent Domain 
(1987); Samuel Von Pufendorf, Natural Law and the Law of Nations (De Officio Hominis Et 
Civis Prout Ipsi Praescribuntur Lege Naturali) (1673); Murray N. Rothbard, For a New Liberty 
(1973); Michael S. Rozeff, Original Appropriation and It’s Critics, LEWROCKWELL.COM (Sept. 
1, 2005), http://www.lewrockwell.com/rozeff/rozeff18.html; Carl Watner, The Proprietary 
Theory of Justice in the Libertarian Tradition, 6 J.  LIBERTARIAN STUD. 289 (1982). 
15 But never, perish the thought, “weigh” up the two different rights and attempt to mediate 
between them. 
16 Walter E. Block, The Privatization of Roads and Highways: Human and Economics Factors, 
THE MISES INST. (2009). 
17 There is “biblical” precedence for this: the sign of the cross. 
18 Here we arrive at a sharp divergence between libertarianism and JJT, who appears to take the 
contrary point of view. See below. 
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to rape? Certainly. They can say that persons have a right to life only if they 
didn't come into existence because of rape; or they can say that all persons 
have a right to life, but that some have less of a right to life than others, in 
particular, that those who came into existence because of rape have less. But 
these statements have a rather unpleasant sound. Surely the question of 
whether you have a right to life at all, or how much of it you have, shouldn't 
turn on the question of whether or not you are a product of a rape.19 
 
 This is JJT’s first attempt to wrestle with abortion in the case of rape.  I find this to be 
highly problematic. Whether or not something has a “rather unpleasant sound” should not be 
determinative of any philosophical conclusion. And the “surely” sounds more like arm waving 
that a serious analysis of rights. We shall have to defer our exploration of where JJT and 
libertarianism diverge in the case of rape until she next considers it, below, since the present 
paper is an attempt to reply to every jot and tittle of her analysis, in the order in which she deals 
with these issues. And, she mentions rape and a few other controversies at several points. 
 
 Next, our authoress confronts the cases where “the mother has to spend the nine months 
of her pregnancy in bed,” or, even, “a case in which, miraculously enough, the pregnancy went 
on for nine years, or even the rest of the mother's life.”20 Although JJT does not explicitly say 
this, reading in between the lines one can infer she would make exceptions in these cases. That is 
to say, this philosopher would then allow an abortion to occur. In sharp contrast, evictionism 
makes no such exception. In all of these instances, the mother may legally evict the fetus, but in 
none of them, whether her pregnancy takes “nine years, or even the rest of the mother's life” may 
she property abort; that is, both evict and also murder. Does this sound “rather unpleasant?” Not, 
at least, to (my) libertarian ears. After all, the woman is not at all condemned to almost a decade, 
or many decades, of pregnancy. She can end it at any time she desires. She is precluded, 
however, only from murdering her baby. What about when “continuation of the pregnancy is 
likely to shorten the mother’s life,”21 or even end it, forthwith? Here, JJT is explicit and adamant. 
These for her certainly constitute cases where abortion is entirely justified.22 This is not so for 
the evictionist position, which remains steadfast (logically consistent?)  throughout the analysis 
of all such examples: eviction is always justified no matter what are the specifics, whether it 
would kill the fetus or not, and murder never is defensible. 
 
 JJT calls “the view that abortion is impermissible even to save the mother's life ‘the 
extreme view.’”23 Her analysis of this case continues to be marred by her weighing of the 
importance or value of rights when they supposedly clash. This is exemplified by her following 
statement: 
 
                                                 
19 Thomson, supra note 2, at 49.  
20 Id. at 50. 
21 Id. 
22 Perhaps I should not say, here, “certainly,” in view of the fact of the very last sentence of her 
essay, discussed above. But, at least at this point she seems pretty much of this view. 
23 Id.  
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If mother and child have an equal right to life, shouldn't we perhaps flip a 
coin? Or should we add to the mother's right to life her right to decide what 
happens in and to her body, which everybody seems to be ready to grant--
the sum of her rights now outweighing the fetus's right to life?24  
 
This remark “sounds” a big tongue in cheek, but it masks an important insight. There is no 
“weighing” to be done. The mother owns the womb. The unwanted fetus, no matter how it came 
to be there, is a trespasser. The pregnant women may properly expel this little innocent occupier 
of her private property who does so without her permission. She is only precluded from 
murdering it. 
 
VII. Killing Versus Letting Die  
 
 JJT takes a more serious stab at resolving the challenge of incompatible rights by 
examining the difference between killing and letting die. She avers, not unreasonably, that the 
former is worse than the latter. After all, right now, there are numerous people perishing in the 
poor nations of the world. These inhabitants of Africa and Asia and South America could be 
saved were we to bestir ourselves to do so. We are, then, “letting them die” as we go about our 
ordinary business, pretty much ignoring them for the most part. But are we murderers? Certainly 
not, at least this does not hold true for the libertarian, who disavows any positive rights, such as 
the “right” to life. For those, however, who do buy into this notion, all of us who allow the 
poverty-stricken of the world perish by not being Good Samaritans with regard to them are 
indeed guilty of murder. The libertarian finds this grotesque, and properly so, since we would all 
be guilty of this “crime,” even people who do their very best to address this horror.25 
 
 But JTT correctly rejects all this. She disagrees with this resolution of the (non-existent) 
conflict of rights challenge, writing: “If anything in the world is true, it is that you do not commit 
murder, you do not do what is impermissible, if you reach around to your back and unplug 
yourself from that violinist to save your life.”26 But why not? Our author fails to answer this meta 
question. For the libertarian, the answer is simple. It is because we are all self-owners (slavery is 
an abominable violation of rights).27 Thus, the violinist’s bed partner owns her own body, her 
                                                 
24 Id.  
25 For example, Mother Teresa. Even she would be guilty of murder for, despite her best efforts, 
many poor people still die before “their time.” 
26 Id. at 52.  
27 Unless of course it is voluntary. See Anna-Karin Andersson, An alleged contradiction in 
Nozick’s entitlement theory. 21 J.  LIBERTARIAN STUD. 43 (2007); Walter E. Block, Market 
Inalienability Once Again: Reply to Radin, 22 THOMAS JEFFERSON L. J. 37 (1999); Danny 
Frederick, Voluntary Slavery, 4 LAS TORRES DE LUCCA 115 (2014); Stephen Kershnar, A Liberal 
Argument for Slavery, 34 J.  SOC. PHILOSOPHY 510 (2003); J. C. Lester, Escape from Leviathan 
(2000); Bionic Mosquito, The Sanctity of Contract, BIONICMOSQUITO.BLOGSPOT.COM (Apr. 19, 
2014 9:06 pm), http://bionicmosquito.blogspot.com/2014/04/the-sanctity-of-contract.html; 
Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia 58, 283, 331 (1974); Hillel Steiner, An Essay on 
Rights 232 (1994); Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Realm of Rights at 283 (1990). 
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own life. It is up to her, and her alone, to determine who may or may not plug into her kidney, a 
part of her body. For the evictionist position, the response is if anything even more clear-cut. 
When the victimized woman reaches around her back an unplugs her umbilical connection to the 
violinist, she is evicting him, not murdering him, even though he will necessarily die as a result 
of her properly legal action. The violinist, here, plays the role of the baby in the first two 
trimesters. 
  
VIII. Third Parties  
 
In the next section of her paper, JJT analyzes the actions of third parties. She does so on 
the basis of yet another brilliant philosophical story: she imagines an infant growing so big in a 
female’s little house (e.g., the pregnant woman’s body) that it crushes her to death.28 Now, for 
evictionism, the solution is straight-forward: evict this ballooning baby; it if can live outside of 
the “house,” well and good. If not, too bad, private property rights must take precedence. But for 
JJT this conundrum evolves into the highly irrelevant discussion of whether the mother may do 
so, or may a third party act in this way in her behalf:  
 
[W]e cannot simply read off what a person may do from what a third party 
may do. Suppose you filed yourself trapped in a tiny house with a growing 
child. I mean a very tiny house, and a rapidly growing child--you are already 
up against the wall of the house and in a few minutes you'll be crushed to 
death. The child on the other hand won't be crushed to death; if nothing is 
done to stop him from growing he'll be hurt, but in the end he'll simply burst 
open the house and walk out a free man. Now I could well understand it if a 
bystander were to say. “There's nothing we can do for you. We cannot choose 
between your life and his, we cannot be the ones to decide who is to live, we 
cannot intervene.” But it cannot be concluded that you too can do nothing, 
that you cannot attack it to save your life. However innocent the child may 
be, you do not have to wait passively while it crushes you to death.29  
 
This immediately preceding claim of Thomson’s is problematic since if an action is just, 
it does not matter who does it, the principal, or an agent she appoints, asks, to undertake it; the 
mother in this case or a bystander, or someone she hires, such as a doctor. However, the 
evictionist would insist in this case that since30 the mother’s life may be saved from the threat of 
the ever-expanding gigantic baby merely by expelling him from her body she may do just that, 
but, not, additionally, kill him. She may only evict him. Libertarian law confines her to this act 
and allows her to go only this far, no further. Here, the analogy between the gigantic space-
occupying baby and the ordinary fetus breaks down. The pregnant woman whose life is in danger 
from her fetus need never kill it, e.g., abort it. Her goal of self-preservation, self-defense, can 
always be met by mere eviction. But suppose this not to be the case. Posit, then, that the only 
way she could save her life was by committing an abortion; kill first, evict later: in effect a 
                                                 
28 Thomson, supra note 2, at 52. 
29 Id.  
30 Note, I do not say “if.” 
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partial birth abortion. Then, we are back at the case of two men struggling for a life boat that can 
support only one. The nod goes to the owner/renter/first homesteader of the boat, as we have 
seen. Here, it is clearly the woman, not the baby, who owns the “house.”31 No truer libertarian 
words were ever said about this than JJT’s: “… what we have to keep in mind is that the mother 
and the unborn child are not like two tenants in a small house which has, by an unfortunate 
mistake, been rented to both: the mother owns the house.”32 Why is this libertarian? This is due 
to its emphasis on private property rights and ownership, the bedrock of this philosophy. 
 
 In the view of JJT:  
 
In our case there are only two people involved, one whose life is threatened, 
and one who threatens it. Both are innocent: the one who is threatened is not 
threatened because of any fault, the one who threatens does not threaten 
because of any fault. For this reason we may feel that we bystanders cannot 
interfere. But the person threatened can (sic).33 
 
No. The third party may also act. A is killing B. Both are innocent. But A is the initiator. 
Say, he is cleaning his gun and accidentally shoots B. Assume, even, that A is a young child. I 
am an outsider. I can only save B by killing A.34 May I do so? B is entirely innocent; A, less so.35 
 
The bystander has no more right to act than the mother (owner of the small house). She 
may delegate to him any right she holds herself.36 But whoever acts in this scenario may not do 
any more than evict, not kill, assuming the former is sufficient for self or other defense. 
 
IX. Thomson as Libertarian  
 
According to JJT: “My own view is that if a human being has any just, prior claim to 
anything at all, he has a just, prior claim to his own body.”37  This places her in the highest 
reaches of libertarian theory. If she takes this to its ultimate logical conclusion, then, she 
                                                 
31 Id. at 53. (“stop(s) to say explicitly that I am not claiming that people have a right to do 
anything whatever to save their lives. I think, rather, that there are drastic limits to the right of 
self-defense. If someone threatens you with death unless you torture someone else to death, I 
think you have not the right, even to save your life, to do so.”). I heartily concur with her on this 
point. See Walter E. Block, The Human Body Shield, 22 J. OF LIBERTARIAN STUD. 625 (2011). 
32 Thomson, supra note 2, at 53. 
33 Id.  Surely, the preceding word should be “may” not “can.” I regard this as a sort of 
typographical error on her part. 
34 Am I a police officer? I claim this does not matter. Cops have no more rights than anyone else, 
in libertarian theory. 
35 Better I should shoot A’s guardian if in this way I could save B. He is guiltier than either of the 
others, for letting this child anywhere near a loaded gun. 
36 A complication arises as to whether this delegation must be explicit or may be implicit. For a 




embraces the purest form of that philosophy, anarcho-capitalism. That is, if she would allow not 
only that people own themselves, their own bodies, but also the products of them, their labor, 
and, in turn, what their work produces. This would suggest she opposes taxes not only on work, 
but on anything and everything, since we have not agreed to be so treated.38 JJT even goes so far 
                                                 
38 See Terry Anderson, P.J. Hill, An American Experiment in Anarcho-Capitalism: The Not So 
Wild, Wild West, 3 J. LIBERTARIAN STUD. 9 (1979); Bruce L. Benson, Enforcement of Private 
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LEWROCKWELL.COM (Oct. 13, 2010) l; Doug Casey, On Anarchy, CASEYRESEARCH.COM (Mar. 
31, 2010), http://www.lewrockwell.com/blog/lewrw/archives/134782.html; Gerard Casey, 
LIBERTARIAN ANARCHY: AGAINST THE STATE (2012); Thomas J. DiLorenzo, The Culture of 
Violence in the American West: Myth versus Reality, 15 THE INDEPENDENT REV. 227 (2010); R. 
England, The state: what can we replace it with?, LEWROCKWELL.COM (Mar. 31, 2013), 
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as to apply this brilliant insight of hers to “coats”39 of all things: “… at long last”40 this author 
questions the right to life, a philosophical howler if ever there was one. She does so with yet 
another stupendous example. Does she have the right to the cool hand of Henry Fonda on her 
forehead if she needs it to sustain her own life? Quite properly JJT maintains it would be very, 
very nice if the movie actor complied in this manner, but that it would be supererogatory, over 
and above the call of duty.41 
 
 At this point, JJT returns to her misbegotten attempt to distinguish second and third party 
rights. She maintains properly that the bedmate has the right to pull the plug on the violinist; but 
she then ruins the analysis by expressing the opinion that no one else does. This author forgets 
that not only is self-defense justified, so is defense of others.  Certainly, if the bed-mate asks 
some third party to act as her agent and pull the plug for her,42 that would be entirely legitimate. 
She cannot for some reason reach all the way around her back to unplug herself from the 
                                                 
of-alternatives/; Stefan Molyneux, Michael Badnarik, How much government is necessary, 
FREEDOMAINRADIO.COM (July 5, 2009), http://www.freedomainradio.com/Videos.aspx; Robert 
P. Murphy, But Wouldn't Warlords Take Over? MISES.ORG (July 7, 2005), 
http://mises.org/library/wouldnt-warlords-take-over. Robert P. Murphy, Overrating Government 
Service, MISES.ORG (Mar. 15, 2010), https://mises.org/library/overrating-government-service; 
Robert P. Murphy, Where Are the Rothbardian Defense Agencies?, MISES.CA (Dec. 14, 2013), 
https://www.mises.ca/where-are-the-rothbardian-defense-agencies/; 
Robert P. Murphy, Drug Gangs and Private Law, MISES.CA (Dec. 7, 2013), 
http://mises.ca/posts/blog/drug-gangs-and-private-law/; Robert P. Murphy, Randians versus 
Rothbardians, MISES.CA (Dec. 22, 2014), http://mises.ca/posts/blog/randians-versus-
rothbardians/; Rockwell Jr., Llewellyn H., Against the State: An Anarcho-Capitalist Manifesto 
(2014); Rockwell Jr., Llewellyn H., What Libertarianism Is, and Isn't, LEWROCKWELL.COM 
(Mar. 31, 2014), http://www.lewrockwell.com/2014/03/lew-rockwell/what-libertarianism-is-and-
isnt/; Murray N. Rothbard, FOR A NEW LIBERTY (1973); Murray N. Rothbard, Society Without a 
State, 7 THE LIBERTARIAN FORUM (1975); Murray N. Rothbard, Do you hate the state?, 10 THE 
LIBERTARIAN FORUM (1977); Murray N. Rothbard, The Ethics of Liberty (1982); Butler Shaffer, 
The Wizards of Ozymandias: Reflections on the Decline and Fall (2012); Peter Sloterdijk, The 
Grasping Hand: The modern democratic state pillages its productive citizens, THE CITY 
JOURNAL (2010); Lysander Spooner, No Treason: The Constitution of No Authority and A Letter 
to Thomas F. Bayard (1870); Edward P. Stringham, Anarchy and the Law: The Political 
Economy of Choice (2007); Morris And Linda Tannehill, THE MARKET FOR LIBERTY (1984); 
Patrick Tinsley, With Liberty and Justice for All: A Case for Private Police, 14 J.  LIBERTARIAN 
STUD. 95 (1998-1999); Robert Wenzel, Robert Ringer's Strawman Anarchist, 
LEWROCKWELL.COM (February 2, 2013), http://lewrockwell.com/wenzel/wenzel211.html; 
39 Thomson, supra note 2, at 53.  
40  Id. at 55.  
41 Query for JJT: Suppose that all that were needed to save someone’s life was not that he “fly in 
from the West Coast” (Id. at 55), to provide it, but merely pay some taxes to support a hospital or 
socialized medicine. This would be a litmus test to determine whether she embraces 
libertarianism to the extent maintained in the text above. 
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musician. May she hire someone else to do so for her? Of course she may, at least if the criterion 
for righteous behavior is adherence to the libertarian non-aggression principle (NAP). Later in 
her essay, JJT avails herself of the Kitty Genovese example, a woman who was murdered in the 
face of dozens of onlookers who did not even bestir themselves to call the police to aid her, 
much less do so themselves at some risk. But if we take seriously this view of our author, and 
how else should we consider her prose, then it would be impermissible for any third party to 
protect Kitty from her assailant, something repulsive to all men of good will, certainly including 
JJT who opines:  
 
But does he have a right against everybody that they shall refrain from 
unplugging you from him? To refrain from doing this is to allow him to 
continue to use your kidneys. It could be argued that he has a right against us 
that we should allow him to continue to use your kidneys. That is, while he 
had no right against us that we should give him the use of your kidneys, it 
might be argued that he anyway has a right against us that we shall not now 
intervene and deprive him of the use of your kidneys.43   
 
Our author is caught in a bit of a logical contradiction here. Yes, the violinist is an 
innocent passerby; he lacks mens rea. But he is still a trespasser, albeit unintentionally. Thus, the 
bed-mate has a right to disconnect, as do all third parties such as all those now reading this 
article. If the violinist is in the wrong, and he is, he is, then anyone may put things right by 
unhooking him.44  
 
X. Using Another Person’s Body  
 
 Next, consider this contribution of hers: 
 
I would stress that I am not arguing that people do not have a right to life--
quite to the contrary, it seems to me that the primary control we must place 
on the acceptability of an account of rights is that it should turn out in that 
account to be a truth that all persons have a right to life. I am arguing only 
that having a right to life does not guarantee having either a right to be given 
the use of or a right to be allowed continued use of another person s body--
even if one needs it for life itself.45 
 
It seems that JJT is here treading very close to committing a logical contradiction and is only 
barely saved from completely going over this precipice by unusual cases. As we have seen 
                                                 
43 Id. at 56.  
44 This holds true except of course if the kidney-source woman now allows the musician to stay 
connected to her. Then trespass is converted to the placing out of the welcome mat. But the same 
thing can apply to Kitty Genovese. If she changes her mind and now regards her (previous) 





above, all rights imply obligations incumbent upon other people. If I have a right not to be 
murdered, raped, enslaved, then the entire rest of humanity have a duty not to perpetuate these 
unwarranted acts upon me. So far, there is no problem. But, if I have a right to life, and need for 
that purpose food, clothing, shelter, etc., then everyone else is thereby obliged to provide these 
things for me. The only exception46 would be if other people also need precisely these things to 
stay alive, surely a rare case in a modern western economy. Then we arrive at the case of two 
drowning people, each with a right to life, and a row boat which can accommodate only one of 
them. 
 
XI. Abortion in the Case of Rape  
 
 Next, we consider the case of the child who is the product of rape; this gives rise to the 
widest divergence between evictionism and the views of JJT. In the former perspective, all 
babies have equal rights not to be unjustifiably killed, that is, murdered. They are all innocent, 
and precisely to the same degree. In the latter, this is not so. But is there not a relevant 
difference, in that in the ordinary pregnancy, the woman has in effect “invited” her baby into her 
small “house” or womb, while this does not at all apply to the infant who results from rape? Not 
a bit of it. JJT slams the door shut to this possible interpretation with yet another brilliant insight 
of hers, which is worth quoting extensively:  
 
If the room is stuffy, and I therefore open a window to air it, and a burglar 
climbs in, it would be absurd to say, “Ah, now he can stay, she's given him a 
right to the use of her house--for she is partially responsible for his presence 
there, having voluntarily done what enabled him to get in, in full knowledge 
that there are such things as burglars, and that burglars burgle.” It would be 
still more absurd to say this if I had had bars installed outside my windows, 
precisely to prevent burglars from getting in, and a burglar got in only 
because of a defect in the bars. It remains equally absurd if we imagine it is 
not a burglar who climbs in, but an innocent person who blunders or falls in. 
Again, suppose it were like this: people-seeds drift about in the air like pollen, 
and if you open your windows, one may drift in and take root in your carpets 
or upholstery. You don't want children, so you fix up your windows with fine 
mesh screens, the very best you can buy. As can happen, however, and on 
very, very rare occasions does happen, one of the screens is defective, and a 
seed drifts in and takes root. Does the person-plant who now develops have 
a right to the use of your house? Surely not--despite the fact that you 
voluntarily opened your windows, you knowingly kept carpets and 
upholstered furniture, and you knew that screens were sometimes defective. 
Someone may argue that you are responsible for its rooting, that it does have 
a right to your house, because after all you could have lived out your life with 
bare floors and furniture, or with sealed windows and doors. But this won't 
do--for by the same token anyone can avoid a pregnancy due to rape by 
                                                 
46 And this provides JJT an out from the charge of logical contradiction. 
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having a hysterectomy, or anyway by never leaving home without a 
(reliable!) army.47 
 
So, no, even a woman who engages in voluntary sexual intercourse can in no way be 
interpreted as “inviting” anyone anywhere. Further, an “invitation” logically involves two 
persons: an inviter48 and an invitee. Yet, at the time of intercourse, forgetting about the father, 
there is only one person in existence, the soon-to-be mother. There is not yet any invitee; he has 
not yet come into existence. It takes time for the sperm to reach the egg and enter it. No one, no 
one at all, maintains that the human being can be said to exist before the advent of the fertilized 
egg. The debate is concerned, solely, with when the human “acorn” can become an oak; then, or 
some time afterwards. 
 
But let us, arguendo, ignore these considerations which put paid to the notion that the 
mother owes some special consideration to her child due to any “invitation.” Let us now assume 
that all pregnant women49 did indeed “invite” their babies into their bodies. It still by no means 
logically follows that the duration of the visit should be nine months. Why not nine or ninety 
years, if gestation took that long? Or, how can we possibly rule out “invitations” of nine weeks, 
days, hours, minutes or seconds? If the “invitation” is for anything (significantly) less than nine 
months, evictionism once again cannot be ruled out of court. 
 
XII. Implicit Contracts  
 
Next ponder JJT’s view on a somewhat peripheral (but fascinating) issue. She writes:  
 
If a set of parents do not try to prevent pregnancy, do not obtain an abortion, but 
rather take it home with them, then they have assumed responsibility for it, they 
have given it rights, and they cannot now withdraw support from it at the cost of 
its life because they now find it difficult to go on providing for it.50 
 
There is some truth to this, but not the whole truth and nothing but the truth. In order to defend 
this criticism, we must take a slight detour.  
 
We must all of us be cautious regarding implicit contracts and responsibilities.51 
Nevertheless, the libertarian may not reject implicit contracts in their entirety. You order a cup of 
                                                 
47 Id. at 58-59.   
48 Sort of like George Bush’s “decider.” 
49 Of course apart from rape victims. We must maintain at least some semblance of rationality 
even in hypothetical situations. 
50 Thomson, supra note 2, at 65. 
51 This goes in spades for those who wish to defend the anarcho-capitalist position, for our 
intellectual enemies are forever trying to shoe-horn us into acquiescing in the notion that we 
have all of us implicitly agreed to be subject to governmental authority. They do so on the 
ground that we all pay taxes, live in territory it claims, vote in its democratic elections, use its 
roads and highways, etc. For a refutation of this notion see supra note 23. 
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coffee and quickly drink it down. Where-upon you are presented with a bill for $1 million. Must 
you pay? No. There is an implicit contract that if there is anything unusual about a commercial 
interaction, the person imposing it52 must make it crystal clear that something out of the ordinary 
is taking place. Why? This is because a valid contract must contain a meeting of the minds of the 
two parties. Otherwise, there is no real voluntary interaction, the essence of laissez faire 
capitalist trade, a bed-rock of libertarianism. Take another case. You sign a check and hand it 
over to me. You may not later cancel it on the ground that you were only practicing your 
penmanship. One more. There is a drowning person in the lake. There are a bunch of us on the 
shore, ready to jump in and save him. You dive in first, and strongly swim in his direction. 
Others were ready to do so, but deferred to you, since you took the initiative in this regard. You 
may not now swim to within a few feet of the drowning person otherwise ignoring him, and later 
explain that you had no intention of saving him, but merely enjoy watching people drown from 
up close.53 In striking out toward the drowning person, you in effect implicitly announced you 
were going to (at least make a good faith attempt) save him.  
 
In like manner, JJT is correct in thinking that when parents take their baby home from the 
hospital, they have implicitly assumed at least some sort of responsibility toward him.  But it by 
no means follows that they “cannot (sic)54 now withdraw support from it at the cost of its life.”55 
They may, indeed, do precisely that. However, they are required, at least by libertarian law, to 
notify a relevant authority (orphanage, hospital, church, etc.) of their intention. Nor is this 
mandate demanded of them due to any implicit contract. Rather, it stems from the fact that if 
they refuse to do so, they would be guilty of forestalling or precluding.56 They would be in effect 
preventing someone else from rescuing the drowning swimmer.57 However, suppose there are no 
orphanages, hospitals, etc., willing to care for the now unwanted baby. Stipulate that there is not 
a single solitary soul on the entire planet willing to do so (analogously, no one wants to rescue 
the drowning swimmer, or come to the aid of Kitty Genovese). Then and only then may this 
infant be allowed to die58 with no crime being committed. Unwanted babies and drowning 
swimmers and Kitty Genovese have no (positive) rights to be kept alive any more than does JJT 
have a right to the cool hand on her brow of movie actors, even though her death will ensue from 
its lack. In similar manner, suppose the lifeguard succeeds in rescuing the drowning person, and 
                                                 
52 In this case, of course, the coffee shop owner 
53 Assume only one rescuer can save the drowning man; too many cooks spoil the broth and 
would get in each other’s way. 
54 Should this for all love be, instead, “may” not? 
55 Thomson, supra note 2, at 65. 
56 Walter E. Block, Homesteading, Ad Coelum, Owning Views and Forestalling, 3 THE SOC. SCI. 
96-103 (2008), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1890872; Walter E. Block & 
Joseph A. Butt, Block, Forestalling, Positive Obligations and the Lockean and Blockian 
Provisos: Rejoinder to Stephan Kinsella, 22 EKONOMIA WROCLAW ECON. REV. 27-41 (2016), 
http://ekon.sjol.eu/category/22-3-2016-529.  
57 In libertarian theory, no one may prevent anyone else from homesteading unowned land 
(supra note 10), nor from taking over the guardianship rights of unwanted children. This is 
precisely the act of which this couple is guilty. 
58 And even mercy killed if the only alternative is a long painful death due to starvation 
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brings him back to shore. But this rescued individual is in dire straits, and no one wants to nurse 
him back to health, without which he will die. Any implicit contract between the two, to the 
extent that there is any at all, surely does stretch so far as for legally require that the former is 




Let us conclude by considering the case in which JJT most radically and explicitly 
deviates from libertarian theory. She states: “…a sick and desperately frightened fourteen-year-
old schoolgirl, pregnant due to rape, may of course choose abortion, and that any law which rules 
this out is an insane law.”59 But why is this author not content with a “mere” eviction? It, too, 
would relieve this unfortunate teenager of her unwanted burden that has been forced upon her. 
Moreover, given that abortion equals eviction plus killing, and that this baby, however 
conceived, is as innocent as any other, JJT blatantly contradicts herself when she writes “…I 
agree that the desire for the child's death is not one which anybody may gratify, should it turn out 
to be possible to detach the child alive.”60 The author of this otherwise magnificent essay cannot 
be allowed to have it both ways. It is illogical for her to support that an abortion may properly 
take place under these circumstances, and, also, that this may occur even “…should it turn out to 
be possible to detach the child alive.”61 Which is it, JJT? Why not embrace evictionism, the only 
way to reconcile your two contradictory statements?62 
 
My summary of the present essay is that JJT (1971) is akin to moving the football to the 
one-yard line. Unhappily, she does not score a libertarian touchdown. But, for a scholar who is 
not herself a libertarian, she comes mighty close. 
                                                 
59 Thomson, supra note 2, at 65.  
60 Id. at 66. 
61 Id.  
62 Here is yet another difference between Thomson and libertarianism. The latter does not 
concern itself with morality, decency, ethics, etc., a main focus of JJT. Rather, only, with just 
law, a subset of the former. JJT ranges over both, while libertarians, perforce, must necessarily 
confine themselves to the latter, a proper legal system. 
